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Bureaucracy and the Democratic System
CHARLES S.

HYNEMAN*

A citizen exercising his right to criticize the government is a
good deal like a man with a shotgun. If it's the Fourth of July a
man can fire his shotgun in any direction and get satisfaction out
of the noise he creates. But if he is duck hunting, he has to make
up his mind which duck he wants and take careful aim; otherwise
he comes home empty handed.

It is much the same way with the citizen exercising his right
to criticize the government. He can raise hell generally and get
whatever satisfaction there is in hearing the noise he makes. Or
he can size up the situation carefully, identify something that
doesn't look right and hope to lend a hand to correcting it by addressing his remarks to the precise point.
This short essay is intended for those who want to call their
shots. It is concerned with certain problems that grow out of the
big government of our times. It is based on the recent writings
of a number of people who are concerned that we not let the piling up of power in Washington destroy our democratic way of
governing ourselves.' I hope that what is said here will help guide
* Professor of Government and Director of the Bureau of Government
Research of Louisiana State University. He has been on leave for government service since January, 1942. His Bureaucratic experience includes his
present assignment as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, where he has general responsibility for the internal management of the Commission; and previous positions as Director of
the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications
Commission; Principal Administrative Analyst in the Bureau of the Budget;
and Chief of the Training Branch in the Military Government Divison, Office
of the Provost Marshal, War Department.
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the fire of individuals who wish, not to blast away at government
generally, but rather to bring down some of the things that endanger the effectiveness and security of our democracy.
It will be well to start by making sure that no misunderstanding arises out of the use of the words democracy and bureaucracy.
DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY:

WHAT ARE THEY?

The essential feature of democratic government lies in the
ability of the people to control the individuals who have politic4l
power. If the individuals who are put in public office or who in
any other way get title to political power have to account to the
people for the way they exercise that power, you have a democracy. If the people cannot control the individuals who have
power over them, you may have satisfactory government for
awhile (no doubt there have been benevolent despots) but you
have no way of making sure that such a government will continue
to be satisfactory. The arrangements and procedures that make
it possible for the people to get rid of a set of politicians and office holders when they are convinced that things are not going
right are the features of a government that give it its democratic
character.
The word bureaucracy has not been in our vocabulary as long
as democracy has, and we are not in as much agreement as to its
proper meaning. Some people make it synonymous with arrogant, insolent, arbitrary government. Others make it synonymous
with slow-moving, procedure-bound government. I prefer to say
that bureaucracy is a word for big organization. I don't think we
need to argue about how big an organization must be to be called
bureaucratic. When it is big enough that you have to make a
search to find who is responsible for its policies, or big enough
that it has to have its principal policies and procedures written
out, or big enough that you think it takes too long for one part to
find out what another part proposes to do-in any such case it is
big enough to be called a bureaucracy as I use the term in this
essay.
Business corporations, churches, and other non-governmental
enterprises can have big organizations and they can be just as
Lawrence Sullivan, Bureaucracy Runs Amuck. Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1944. Pp. 318. $2.00.

Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy. Yale University Press, New Haven,
1944. Pp. viii, 125. $2.00.
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slow-moving, just as procedure-bound, and just as arbitrary as
any governmental bureaucracy. The books under review, however, deal almost exclusively with the federal government and
what is said in this essay will relate primarily to the executiveadministrative branch of the federal government.
RELATION OF BUREAUCRACY TO DEMOCRACY

In trying to show how bureaucracy affects the security and
effectiveness of our democracy, it will be necessary to show the
effect of our big administrative departments on the ability of the
people to control the affairs of government. It is not enough to
point out that some bureaucratic organizations are not as efficient
as we would like. Some grocery stores give rotten service and
go bankrupt but that does not prove that capitalism is a poor
system. Many ministers of the gospel are poor preachers and
some positively go wrong but that does not prove that religion
is a mistake.
What we must get at in this essay is the behavior (the attitudes, states of mind, things that go on) or -particular administrative departments and the executive-administrative branch as
a whole that tend to make it easy or to make it hard for the
citizen t6 find out what is going on and take the action that keeps
the policies and performance within the bounds set by the popular will. In view of the content and emphasis of the books being
reviewed, this will be done by giving attention to the following
questions: (1) What can the chief executive and the administrative departments do that would endanger democratic government? (2) What is the relation of the President to responsible
exercise of administrative power? (3) Can Congress control the
executive-administrative branch? (4) Can the people control the
bureaucracy by direct action? (5) Can government get too big
to be controlled?
can the executive-administrative branch endanger
democracy?
There are four principal ways in which the chief executive
and the various departments can effectively obstruct democratic
processes. and weaken or destroy the democratic institutions of
the country: (a) They may interfere with or prejudice elections;
(b) they may misinform the people about the issues that confront
the public, about how these issues may be dealt with, and about
what is being done to meet them; (c) they may inaugurate and
pursue policies of government which are positively contrary to
How
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the public will; and (d) they may, by sheer inefficiency in their
operations, destroy popular faith in democratic government.
Prejudicing elections. The chief executive and the principal
officers in administrative departments are leaders of political
groups. They got in office by winning elections; they hope to stay
in power by winning elections. It is natural that they should seek
to win elections, by whatever means seem promising, including
the use of the governmental, authority and power that they
control.
In some countries the crowd in power uses the army to break
up political parties, to control voting, and to destroy the whole
system of free elections. We appear to be safely past that stage
in the United States. But the great organizations of civilian public employees can be used to the same end. State and city police
forces can break up political meetings, scare people away from
the polls, destroy ballot boxes, line up illegal voters, and what
not. A state highway department can plaster the telephone poles
of the state with posters, coerce voters by putting them on and
off the payroll, haul people from precinct to precinct for multiple
voting, and a lot of other things that ought never to be thought
of. No one in Louisiana who is old enough to read this article
needs to be told about these things.
It is noteworthy that none of the writers under review finds
it necessary to discuss this problem in describing the power of the
federal bureaucracy. This is not due to any failure to realize that
free elections are a basic pillar of the democratic process. They
simply see no need for discussing activities of this sort. They take
it for granted that the FBI will not line up voters for the party
in power, and that the employees of the Department of Agriculture will not break up political meetings. The country, by common consent, long ago put a stop to skullduggery of this sort in
the federal government. We wrote the latest chapter in that book
of reform during the past decade when we enacted the Hatch Act
and supplementary legislation making it illegal for federal employees to participate in the activities of political parties. Louisiana attempted the same thing in its civil service legislation in
1940.2

This is not to say that the party in control of the federal
governments finds no way of using the power of government to
influence elections and make sure its continuance in power. They
2. Cf. Hyneman, Political and Administrative Reform in the 1940 Legislature (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1, 22-23, 43-45.
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act in more subtle fashion; the purpose of the act is rarely admitted and frequently hard to identify. Necessary action on legislation is delayed until after elections; contracts are granted or
refused; the enforcement of the law grows more lax for some and
more rigid for others; important prosecutions are stalled or
dropped altogether.
These are things that may be done on the grand scale under
the lead of the President. They may be the act of a particular
administrative department under the lead of a cabinet officer.
They may be the program of a bureau chief or the head of a local
office of a great department. And these are things that may vary
in the slightest degree from the most honest and impartial administration of government. Every popular act of the g9vernment is a bid for votes for the party in power, since a program
that satisfies the people is the strongest reason for continuing the
administration in power. How are you and I to know when the
administration puts a partisan or dishonest twist on its action for
the precise purpose of picking up some votes that wouldn't otherwise be had?
This matter of the use of governmental power for improper
purposes designed to win elections goes to the very heart of
democratic government. None of the books under review address
themselves sufficiently to this problem to recommend them as a
place to acquire any great enlightenment on this subject. The full
analysis of this problem awaits the hand of a careful and wise
observer. Either Appleby or Pusey could do it the way it should
be done.
Misinforming the public. Free elections become a farce if the
people are denied access to information or prevented from having
the kind of discussion that clarifies their minds and enables them
to form judgments about candidates and issues. The individuals
who control the government have an enormous power over the
ability of the voter to know what the facts and issues are. Office
holders seeking reelection give a one-sided view of their achievements in office. Party managers and publicity agents paint black
and rosy pictures without any regard to the facts unless they are
completely favorable. Newspapers are bought off by giving them
government contracts for printing and party contracts for advertising.
These practices have led to insistent and persistent demand
for more frequent and more complete official reports by government departments-national, state and local-describing what the
government has actually been doing. Lately, however, we have
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begun to fear that maybe we are doing too much reporting. The
administration in power determines what will be said in the official report, be it annual report or today's press release. The
administration in power determines their format and subject to
some control by statute and appropriation, determines how much
will be spent on reports, how many copies will be printed, and
to whom they will go. And all this is done with your money and
mine. Money we pay in taxes is thus used to convince us that
the best thing we can do for ourselves is vote the present administration back in power.
No doubt all the authors of the books in review know this
as well as you and I do. Only three of them give any attention
to the problem, however. Crider, Pusey and Sullivan are concerned about what is happening. Crider 3 goes into the problem
at greatest length, shows how government reporting and official
propaganda relate to the functioning of democracy, and states
clearly his fear that our money is being spent to sell us another
term of the crowd in power. Pusey I confines his comment to the
period of World War II. He charges the Roosevelt administration
with having withheld information essential to intelligent action
by the public, with having timed the release of information to
serve the advantage of the administration in power, and with
having colored the account of events to cast a rosier'hue on the
administration's success in prosecuting the war. But Pusey does
not lay out in clear language the significance of these practices
for the democratic process. Sullivan5 has a chapter of twenty
pages on the "War of Ink Pots" which appears to have as its primary purpose to show how the federal government wastes money
on publicity. His account contains a few paragraphs of comment
(principally borrowed from other writers) on the relation of
excessive publicity to popular control of government.
None of these books advances us very far toward the resolution of one of the greatest dilemmas confronting democratic
government-how to get full reporting of the acts of government
officials without also getting prejudice or propaganda in favor
of those who are in power. This is another good task for Appleby
of Pusey.
Pursuing policies contrary to the popular will. One of our
most treasured maxims is that we have a government of law
and not a government of men. The statement has two implica3. Crider, op. cit. supra note 1, at 197-211.

4. Pusey, op. cit. supra note 1, at 146-147.
5. Sullivan, op. cit. supra note 1, at 78-98.
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tions: that all basic policies should be determined by the legislative department, and that administrative officers, in carrying
out those policies, should proceed according to announced rules
and standards and not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
Both these implications of the maxim are sound ideals for democratic government.
The representative legislative assembly is an indispensable
feature of democratic government today as in the past. It was
by grabbing the power first to advise the king on policy, then to
veto the king's proposal, and finally to propose and decree public
policy by enactment of statutes that the people of England
represented in Parliament got control of their government. The
failure Qr inability to establish sturdy and stubborn representative lawmaking bodies is a principal explanation of why the
common man has not been able to get a firmer control over government' in European countries. Even so, the first act of the dictator of our era was to destroy the representative assembly and
so remove a primary source of organized opposition to his will.
In our own country the lawmaking power was firmly lodged
in Congress by the federal constitution. The President shares the
power, but the construction consistently given the constitution
allows him no power to decree low on his'own authority except
in certain specified situations, only one of which is importantthe authority to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
The situation as respects state governments differs widely over
the country. In some states the governor and other executive
officers have virtually no power except that given them by act
of the legislature. In certain other states, Louisiana is a notable
illustration, the constitution vests directly in the governor and
certain other departments of government a very considerable
power to make public policy. This practice of removing blocks
of governmental authority from the control of the representative
assembly has undoubtedly gone furtherest in the case of certain
state commissions-the Louisiana Public Service Commission, for
instance-that have been given power to make the law on certain
matters, interpret it, adjudicate alleged violations, fix penalties,
and order punishment. 6 The whole legislative, judicial and administrative functions are thus combined in one body with no
provision for check by any other governmental authority except
the power of the legislature to withhold funds and the power of
6. La Const. of 1921, Art. Vi, § 6. Cf. Hyneman, Administrative Adjudication: An Analysis (1936) 51 Pol. Sci. Q. 383, 391-392, particularly note 32.
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the courts to find the whole business contrary to the United
States Constitution.
The ability of an administrative department to abuse its
power is not measured entirely by the sweep of its discretionary
grant. It may effectively extend its authority by taking preliminary steps which so prejudice a situation that the legislature has
little choice but to confirm and extend the policy tentatively established by the bureaucracy. By the emphasis it gives to administration-vigorous action here, little attention to that, no
action at all in these cases-the department may convert a carefully worded policy of the legislature into a very different thing.
And, if it is allowed to get away with it, the bureaucracy can, of
course, nullify almost any purpose of the legislature by inaction.
General expressions of policy have to be fitted to a great
variety of specific situations and this undoubtedly necessitates a
very great delegation of authority to administrative officials and
departments. Whether these delegations are compatible with
democratic ideals or not depends on the importance of the affairs
to which they relate and the certainty that the administrative
action has to comply with the public will. The British have developed the practice of making many of the acts of administrative
departments conditional on the subsequent approval of Parliament. We have made almost no use of that device. On the other
hand we have begun to develop arrangements for more immediate
popular control over the administrative department-by establishing representative authorities to exercise the power, by creating representative advisory bodies to advise the officer who
has the power to act, and by arranging for popular referenda on
the acts of the administrative officer. These devices are discussed
in more detail below. 7
It is a matter of opinion whether the arrangements for popular control of power are keeping up with the delegations to the
executive-administrative branch. I happen to think that they are
not, either in the case of the national government, or the government of the forty-eight states. It happens to be my own opinion
first that, with what Congress gave him and what he took, the
President acquired more power than he ought to have had for
running the country during the late war; second, that Congress
failed in its duty to pick up and incorporate in statute many of
the acts which the President very properly took in the first instance; and third, that the President in turn gave some of the
7. Infra, pp. 336-340.
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administrative departments and agencies wider discretion than
the necessities of the situation demanded.
At least five of the books in review have something to say
concerning the danger that the executive-administrative branch
will be given too free a hand in making policy, or will set out
on policies of its own liking, notwithstanding what the legislative branch may have decreed. Crider reveals throughout his
book that he dislikes the tendency of recent years to let the chief
executive and the administrative departments fix a great part of
the policies which they will enforce, but he does not bring his
observations together at any point in a significant discussion of
the problem. 8 Sullivan 9 is against everything the national government does and the way it does it, but with respect to this
problem as with respect to all others, he offers nothing that could
help a responsible citizen make up his mind what he ought to do
to improve matters. Milton, whose entire book is devoted to the
use of presidential power,10 throws surprisingly little light on the
relation of the chief executive's forays to the maintenance of
institutions and ways that time has proved to be essential to a
democratic system. His principal purpose is to recount the things
that great men did; not to show what impress these great men
made on our democratic system. Pusey does a much better job
on the seizure of power by the President in World War II. In a
chapter entitled "Government Outruns the Law" 11 he shows in
detail how President Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed authority,
created governmental agencies and vested power in them, determined how the public money should be spent; and how he
justified all these acts under a theory of presidential power in
wartime which Pusey thinks entirely improper in view of the
language of the constitution. But Pusey's discussion concerns the
extension of presidential power; he has little if anything to say
about the tendency of the bureaucracy generally to defy Congress
or prejudice public policy.
Appleby inhis Big Democracy had a great deal to say about
the practices of administrative departments that are designed
to fit policy to the needs of the people. It is clear enough that he
recognizes Congress as supreme in establishing the purposes and
objectives of government. He has virtually nothing to say, however, about the danger that bureaucracy will try to go its own
S. Crider, op. cit. supra note 1, at 298-329.

9. Sullivan, op. cit. supra note 1.
10. Milton, op. cit. supra note 1.

11. Pusey, op. cit. supra note 1, at 48-73.
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way in defiance of Congress and the people. It seems a fair conclusion that he considers the danger inconsequential in our system of government.
Inefficiency of government. Government is established and
maintained to do things. No government will long be tolerated by
an intelligent and free people if it consistently fails to do the
things the people want it to do. When they get all out of patience
with reform movements and repair jobs that still leave them
without the kind of government they want, the people may come
out for a new kind of government altogether.
If the American people are to keep their faith in democracy,
therefore, our democratic system must work with some degree
of efficiency. It is on this matter of efficiency that Juran and
Appleby have most to offer the reader. Crider and Sullivan have
plenty to say about bureaucratic inefficiency but much of it is
not convincing and little indeed is constructive. Sullivan particularly is content to point to instances of a department's failure to
accomplish its purpose and do it gracefully. He and Crider make
little effort to explain why inefficiency is so widespread and
persistent and they make precious little effort indeed to show
what can be done to make administration more efficient, other
than quit trying to supply government to the people.
The books by Juran and Appleby are of a very different
quality. Juran appears to be by profession a management engineer. In his Bureaucracy:A Challenge to Better Management he
combines his prewar industrial experience and his wartime
experience in the federal government in an effort to explain why
governmental bureaucracy behaves as it does, and what might
be done to make its performance more efficient than it is. A book
of less than one hundred and fifty pages (and not very compact
print at that) is much too brief to provide a detailed account of
the inefficiency of the federal bureaucracy, let alone to explain
how that condition came about and to suggest how it might be
corrected. Juran's work is accordingly only an introduction to
the problem, It strikes me as a work of great good sense, generally
sympathetic toward the bureaucrat, and an effective antidote to
the distortions and fulminations of so much of the writing about
government, typified best by Sullivan. In my opinion, Juran
does not charge our civil service system (the legislation and its
administration) with its full share of responsibility. for the
shortcomings of federal administration. On the other hand he
does a very good job of showing how your readiness and mine
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to jump on the bureaucrat the minute he does something we
don't understand forces the bureacrat to cover up in a way that
is itself disastrous to efficiency. A well oiled industrial organization, says Juran, will have one management engineer for every
one hundred employees or less. Who believes that Congress or
the American people would allow a federal department to staff
itself with management experts at one-tenth of that ratio? I think
Juran shows pretty clearly that we have poor government in
large part because the public, including businessmen in Congress,
is not willing for the bureaucrat to imitate the methods of the
businessman.
Appleby is not a management engineer. He is a newspaperman of wide experience who came into the federal service
in 1933, held important positions in at least three administrative
departments, and went out of the federal service to a higher
paying job in the radio industry eleven years later. Appleby's
Big Democracy is not directed toward a specific- central problem
as is Juran's book. Instead of developing propositions related to
a specific objective like "how to make the bureaucracy efficient,"
Appleby is merely concerned to record his observations and his
thought on a wide range of problems which he has encountered
in his relations with government and politics from both inside
and outside. The book shows that he has had a wide range of
interests and experiences, that he is a penetrating observer of
what goes on, and that he has acquired wisdom in respect to the
ways of men.
Appleby's book is therefore rambling and many-pointed;
not compact and single-pointed. He accepts broad programs of
governmental action in social and economic affairs as inevitable;
he believes that governmental action must accord with the wishes
of the people; he believes that the people who man our administrative departments are by and large devoted both to the
accomplishment of the popular will and to efficient and economical operations in achieving those ends. Himself sympathetic with
big government, with democratic control and with the bureaucrat, he believes that if you and I understood the bureaucrat and
his problems as he does, we would join hands with Congress,
department head and civil-servant-down-the-line to produce a
more efficient and more democratic brand of government than we
are now getting. I think he does a pretty good job of it. His book
should discourage some of the Fourth of July firing in the air
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that goes on and help the intelligent reader to set his sights on
a target that he really wants to hit.
What is the Relation of the President to Responsible Exercise
,of Administrative Power?
I do not believe there is any tougher problem to handle, in
an analysis of responsibility in administration than the role
played by the President. He is, of course, the chief executive
and is therefore supposed to control the administrative departments and keep them in pursuit of the public welfare. But as
chief executive and leader of the administrative branch the
President, above anyone else, is in a position to turn the great
mass of bureaucratic power against the people. Twenty-five years
ago this was not a matter of more than academic concern to us.
The world's experience with dictatorship during the past few
decades, and the certainty that any would-be dictator for
America would make the presidency his ultimate goal, forces
thoughtful people in our time to inquire just how much power
the president has and how much chance we have of controlling it.
The paragraphs that follow make no pretense of setting forth
all the 'considerations that are relevant in such an inquiry; I hope
they indicate what kind of considerations are important. They
center on three bases of the President's power and attempt to
relate each to the problem of making sure that the executiveadministrative branch will conduct itself in accord with the
wishes of the people. These three bases or pillars of presidential
power are: (a) the position of the President as political leader;
(b) the President's legislative power; and (c) the President's
power over the administrative departments.
The President as political leader. Any man who is devoted
to democracy as a form of government believes (1) that the
people are generally the best judges of what is good for them;
(2) that the elected representatives of the people should fix
the policies that government is to carry out; and (3) that
executive and administrative authorities should honestly carry
out those policies or give up their power. This theory is worked
out with great clarity. and simplicity in the city-manager form
of government. The people elect the city council; the council
formulates the policies; and the council appoints the manager
and can fire him if he does not honestly carry out its policies.
Responsibility (or accountability) is clearly established.
No such simple relationships exist in the federal or state
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governments. The people elect Congress and state legislatures
to make public policy but they elect the president and the
governors to help make public policy. Some times they elect a
Republican legislature and a Democratic governor, apparently
fully aware that the governor is pledged to fight for policies
which the legislature is pledged to oppose. We do not do that
in the federal government but we frequently establish a party
in power in one or both houses of Congress while a president
of the opposite party remains in the White House.
This might not be so bad if the President, like the city
manager, understood that he had an obligation faithfully to carry
out the wishes of Congress. Instead, he understands he is pledged
to put into effect the principles to which his administration is
devoted, only slightly modifying them, if modifying them at all,
in view of the later mandate of the people.
But it is not only when different parties control the White
House. and Capitol Hill that supremacy in determining public
policy is questioned. At any moment after a sweeping victory
which gives the same party control of both White House and
Congress, a conversation like the following (this one is completely fictitious) might take place:
Majority Leader of the Senate: "But, Mr. President, I
have to remind you that the Congress is the lawmaking
authority. In passing the Farm Credit Act, Congress made it
quite clear that it did not intend to extend this class of loans
to tenant farmers. In your speech last night and in the press
release by the Secretary of Agriculture this morning you say
that tenant farmers and share croppers will be able to take
advantage of these loans. I have to insist, Mr. President, that
the debate in each house as well as the language of the House
and Senate Committee reports make it quite clear that the
policy of the law does not extend this class of loans to these
people. This administration ought to carry out the will of
the law making body, not to defeat it."
The President: "Nothing hurts me worse, Senator, than
to be obliged to disagree with the leader of the Senate or
with you personally as to what is the policy of this administration and its laws. I was elected to this office and several
hundred of the members of this Congress were elected by the
.people with a clear mandate to do something about the condition of poor people on the farms. Not only that, when 1
approved the draft of the bill that went before the two
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houses and later when I signed the bill and made it a law,
it was my understanding and my intent that these credits
would be available for tenants and sharecroppers. There is
nowhere language in the act which excludes these people from
the benefits of the law. In view of what I said to the people
of the country on this subject last fall, I feel I have an
obligation to extend these credits. This administration cannot
expect to return to power four years from now if it excludes
these people from these benefits, and neither do I believe,
Senator, if you will pardon me, that you can successfully
avoid responsibility on this matter when you come up for
reelection in your state."
This is the dilemma. If the chief executive, having the great
mass of administrative power (the bureaucracy) under him does
not conform to the policies made by the elected policy making
authority, dictatorship is incipient. But the chief executive who
commands that mass of bureaucratic power is himself the
acknowledged leader of the policy makers and has the greatest
prestige of all of them.
How are you to resolve this dilemma? How free the president to lead, to insist, to coerce perhaps in getting established
the policies to which he pledged himself before the people, yet
make it impossible for him to command that mass of power in
defiance of the will of the people?
Such writing as has been done on this problem falls generally
into three schools of thought. First are those writers who propose
that the President be made responsible to Congress, giving up his
office when Congress no longer has confidence in him or is no
longer willing to follow his leadership. These writers would have
the United States imitate the British cabinet system. President
and Congress would be elected on the same day (whether to
continue the overlapping six year terms of Senators would be a
problem); the President would be the acknowledged standard
bearer of the victorious party and the acknowledged leader of
Congress; he would have responsibility for driving Congress to
enact the policies to which he and his party are pledged and for
driving the bureaucracy to put those policies into effect. But if he
turned out to be a weakling, proved incapable of keeping faith
with the pledges made by himself and his party, or proved to
be a would-be dictator headed for more power, the Congress
would forthwith turn him out of power and send him back to
the people to try to sell his theories all over again.
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This system, when it works as planned, presents many very
admirable advantages. If the top party leader and official (Prime
Minister, President) has proper devices to discipline the legislature when it fails to keep faith with the party's pledges, more
unity of leadership and followship can be achieved than we
frequently have under our system. If the top man proved too
greedily bound for power, the legislature, being many men
chosen from many and diverse constituencies, can be counted on
to resist him. And the cabinet system does provide a way of
getting issues before the people when it seems desirable without
waiting for the lapse of a four year term as we do.
Institutions, of course, have a way of not working out quite
as we picture them in theory. The British people find plenty to
complain about in the way their government works; indeed-there
is a growing conviction that the most unsatisfactory features of
their government are inherent in the system of parliamentarycabinet relations which we are asked to imitate. Assuming that
the British system worked perfectly it would not be easy to
decree as successful a form of parliamentary responsibility for
us. The British political machinery has many gadgets which
were developed through generations of experience, they are
geared into the political ways of the British people, and they
are essential to the functioning of their system. They have a
king, they have in a show down only one house of Parliament
to deal with, they elect no official on a nationwide ticket as we do
the President. We could hardly throw out our system lock, stock
and barrel in favor of what the British have developed over the
centuries. If we try to graft their flower on our stalk, we may
get a fruit we do not want. In any event we would have to start
all over again on the task that requires generations in any
democracy, that of bringing the people up to the point where
they understand their system of government and have confidence
in their ability to control it.
The second school of thought on how to reconcile the
President's power with the nation's safety may be called the
"power and faith" school. The doctrine of this school consists of
two propositions: give the President plenty of power, and have
faith that he will not abuse it. Its argument runs something like
this: People do not overthrow their institutions while they are
prospering under them; the power of government can be used to
assure that the nation will be prosperous; governmental action
to that end must be planned, courageous and forceful; planned,
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courageous and forceful government can be obtained only under
integrated leadership free from obstruction; such leadership can
be found only in the President; and he must have sufficient power
in his own right to thrust the government forward on social
programs that assure prosperity for the people.
Thus is the case established for power. The argument in
support of faith is not so well developed. The people elect the
President; he represents them; indeed he is the only true representative for the whole people since members of the House
represent their respective districts and Senators their respective
states; the people would not elect as their representative in the
top place of power a man who would turn against them; and if
they did, they would turn him out before he could do any great
damage.
It was the doctrine of power and faith that supplied the
principal justification for the enormous sweep of power given to
the President during the depression and extended during the
late war. The doctrine seems to be as popular with professional
students of government as with professional practitioners of
politics. It is akin to an optimism formerly held by the country's
business men who gave little attention to government and politics
"because we can make money faster than the politicians can take
it away from us." I am afraid that the present day optimists
who believe that "government can bring prosperity so fast that
dictatorship can't catch up with us" may come to a like disillusionment.
There is a third school of thought on the resolution of the
dilemma presented by the need for vigorous and persistent
leadership by the President and the necessity of restraining him
from using the power he possesses contrary to the wishes of the
people. This school accepts as permanent our present system
of Congress and President with the authority given them in the
Constitution, but seeks to achieve a better balance in the interplay of their powers. This school would arm the President for
more effective leadership in the formulation of policy, but would
also increase the power of Congress to force an accounting as
to how power is used.
Mr. Pusey belongs to the latter school. As noted above,'1 2 a
chapter of his Big Government provides a good statement of the
range of power which the President enjoyed in World War II.
12. See supra p. 318.
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Three more chapters 13 deal With alternatives to the piling up of
presidential power, or search for checks which can be put upon
it. Pusey wants vigorous, effective government, but he wants
safeguards against anti-popular government as well. He sees
much to regret in the centralization of power in Washington, but
he does not think that a campaign to give power back to the
states will yield much fruit. He sees much to admire in the
British type of government, but concludes that "parliamentary
government is no answer to our dilemma." While he believes
the Supreme Court, unpacked, is a potent bulwark of democratic
government, he does not suggest, and I suppose does not believe,
that it can sweep back the power inadvisably given to the
President.
It is to the improvement of Congress that Mr. Pusey turns
for a corrective to the present drift of powers to the President.
As a newspaper man about Washington, he has found Congress
as a whole to be a group of hardworking, well intentioned
intelligent men. He would reapportion committee work so as to
necessitate fewer committees and would find a way to select
chairmen which would give them more effective leadership.
He would give Congress a staff to find the facts that it needs.
And he would establish leadership within Congress which would
both give it "a greater degree of cohesiveness and a better sense
of direction," and marry it to the chief executive in planning
and formulating policy.
To point out in this detail that Mr. Pusey is attached to one
school of thought is not to say that the other authors under
review hold to different faiths. The fact is that none of them
say enough about the dilemma of presidential power and presidential responsibility to identify their philosophy or recommend
that they be read for enlightment on this problem.
Mr. Milton's book, The Use of PresidentialPower, 1789-1943,
is especially disappointing. Apparently his entire purpose in
writing the book was to show what our stronger presidents did in
the exercise of their leadership. He recounts the principal events
in the administrations of eight presidents (Washington, Jefferson,
Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, Wilson and the two Roosevelts)
which reveal how they met the issues that confronted them and
won more than an even share of their battles. These events or
incidents are discussed under one or another of six headings
which Milton treats as "sources" of presidential power. After
13. Pusey, op. cit. supra note 1, at 74-136.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VI

reading the book, I am unable to differentiate them clearly as
separate sources of power. They appear to be: (a) the prestige
of occupying the nation's highest office; (b) the special authority
which the President has in foreign relations; (c) the authority
as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; (d) the President's
general executive power (including the obligation to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed); (e) the President's power
as leader of a political party; and (f) the President's popularity
with the people.
The book does not convince me that, in a practical political
situation, the President's action manifests itself in such a way
as to permit any significant differentiation between action
derived from the first listed "source" of power and action derived
from the last two "sources." The author does show conclusively
enough that strong presidents took vigorous action on political
issues. I do not think his book reveals much more than that.
"One turns to the future with a feeling that the past gives some
guidance to what perhaps we may expect. If the record has any
core of meaning, it is that the way any individual in the high
office will use his presidential power is altogether unpredictable."
This, I believe, is as near to philosophy as Mr. Milton comes in
the book. ".... it can be confidently predicted that the President
of the United States will employ old powers in new ways, or
discover new sources of power, if he even begins to cope with
the crises which will continue to arise.' 1 4 This, I believe, is as
near as the author comes to an expression of concern that
bureaucratic power under the direction of the President may
possibly at some time be turned against the people.
The President'sLegislative Power. A good deal of what was
said in the preceding paragraphs is directly related to the question of our wisdom in entrusting the President with as much
legislative power as we have. In my opinion experience has
proved that the values which democratic government intends to
secure are best secured if fundamental 'policy is made and
changed only with the concurrence of a representative assembly.
When decisions are made by or concurred in by an assembly
consisting of a considerable number of individuals chosen by.
the people from a broad base of independent constituencies
and in a position to give their principal attention to the public
business, the best protection of the public interest is achieved.
When power to make public policy by his sole action is vested
14. Milton, op. cit. supra note 1, at 321-322.
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in the chief executive too much invitation is given for the coup
d'dtat, too much opportunity to move by fait accomplit.
Perhaps no more need be said on that point. But the
possession and exercise by the President of broad power to make
policy, in my opinion, has had a secondary effect of great
seriousness. As I see it, the functioning of government by presidential decree has engendered in the bureaucracy widespread
and deplorable disrespect for Congress and other democratic
controls. The fact that Congress let the President decree so
much of the policy from 1933 to date, and the fact that the
President showed so much audacity in the exercise of 'some of
it, have caused heads of agencies, bureau chiefs and more lowly
civil servants to come to believe that Congress is not competent
,to pass on policies of crucial importance. The fact that the
President and his self appointed advisors did so much of the
country's thinking for it has caused many people in the
bureaucracy to think that the chief executive and the administrative branch constitute an elite more fit than either the people
or their elected representatives to say what is good for the
people.
Whether or not the effects that I apprehend are a fact is
a subject for argument. I draw from Mr. Appleby's pages that
he does not believe any grave danger to democratic ways has
been incurred. Pusey would at least argue the matter with him.
Crider and Sullivan definitely consider the President's assumption of power to have widespread consequences of danger.
Milton appears to be wholly unconcerned.
The President'sPower Over the Administrative Departments.
The past several pages are concerned with the possibility that
the President has acquired power incompatible with a secure
foundation for democracy, and with the possibility that his
possession and exercise of that power has resulted in dislike
if not contempt for democratic control on the part of the
bureaucracy. Clearly the President has the power to point the
administrative departments toward one goal or another and to
inspire bureaucracy for good or for evil. But just how much
power does he have? How much influence can be exert on the
policies and purposes of departments? What can he actually do,
for instance, to force efficiency into an organization where efficiency is notoriously lacking?
The literature on the subject is overwhelmingly in agreement
that the President can exert a complete, dominating and con-
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clusive control over the bureaucracy if the administrative branch
is properly organized and if the President is given proper staff
assistance. This is the assumption on which that most influential
document, the Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management is based. This document, submitted to the
President and to Congress in 1937, proposed a tightening up of
the heirarchical structure which establishes a chain of control
from top to bottom through the power of superiors to appoint
and remove subordinates; recommended a great expansion of
the staff that reports directly to the President on things in
general; and urged action by Congress which would enable it to
check up more effectively on the doings of the President and
the administrative branch. Under this proposal, the independent
regulatory commissions (with the exception of the Interstate
Commerce Commission) would have been absorbed into departments with single executive heads.
The legal profession generally, fearing that quasi-judicial
regulatory action would take on more arbitrary and political
character, opposed the recommendations of the President's Committee as related to the independent commissions. Professional
students of government and politics (in academic lingo, political
scientists) seem with very few exceptions to have endorsed the
whole prescription. The recommendations were put partially into
effect by action of Congress and the President during the years
immediately preceding the war."
The President's Committee assumed that, given an organization such as it proposed, the President could effectively control
the administrative branch. It did not inquire critically into the
possibility that the assumption might be untenable. In a recent
carefully reasoned article, Mr. Pendleton Herring urges that
Congress keep its hands off the administrative departments,
except through appropriation of money, enactment of controlling
statutes and investigation where abuse appears actually to have
occurred.- I understand that Mr. Herring can support such a
recommendation (i. e., that Congress should keep out of the
current operations of the administrative departments) only if
he is convinced that the President, if watched carefully by a
critical Congress, can and will maintain a firm hand on the
administrative hierarchy. But Herring, like the President's
Committee, assumes the President's ability to do this; he does
15. See McGuire, The American Bar Association's Administrative Law
Bill (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 550 and answer by Jaretzki, The Administrative Law Bill: Unsound and Unworkable (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 294.
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not establish it by citation of facts and reasons. His carefully
developed argument centers on the embarrassment and frustration that results from congressional meddling.16
As I see it, what has been written about the President's
ability to control the administrative branch is little more than
a declaration of faith. Whether he can do or does do the
things that constitute effective control is a "Your guess is as
good as mine" proposition. Can he, in view of the demands
on his time, ever know or long remember the main facets of the
policies upon which the government is engaged? Can he give
enough time to even the top figures in his administration to
hear them point out the parting of the ways in issues of policy?
Can he ever do more in the coordination of departments than
say "Get together!"? When public clamor .or the intense heat
of intra-administration war forces him to act, can he act with
more precision than to smash with an axe?
Surely he can on some issues. The President is for spending
federal money on housing or he is against it. If no houses are
being built, he can find out why if he wants to, and he can
take time to find out why at least once. If it is because his
housing program has fallen afoul of the policy pursued by the
federal loan agencies, he can demand that the two departments
get together and he may even. find time to hear the main
arguments and contribute his own judgment to a solution.
But I do not think the President can do much of this. There
are not enough hours in a day or enough days 'in a four year
term for a human being to do the other things that the President
cannot escape doing, and also do very much that can be called
direction of the administrative departments.
It seems to me that the integration and coordination of the
administrative branch is much more of an institutional operation
than an act of the President. It is a matter of the 'way the
Bureau of the Budget acts on the plans of departments-both the
announced policies of the Director of the Bureau and the undisclosed standards of judgment which the budget examiners adhere
to. It is a matter of intelligent action-and unfeeling bureaucratic
resistance to action-in the Civil Service Commission. It is a
matter of General Accounting Office attitudes towards departmental expenditures which hell and high water could not change.
16. Herring, Executive-Legislative Responsibilities (1944) 38 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 1153.
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Bureau of the Budget, Civil Service Commission, General
Accounting Office and a host of other devices integrate and
coordinate the administrative branch. But the President, nevertheless, can personally exert an enormous influence upon the
pace and quality of administration. He can encourage this,
reverse that, and make decisions which enliven the whole tone
of administration or take the heart out of everyone who likes
to see order, confidence and mutual good will among officials.
Some idea of the difference between individual presidents in this
respect can be obtained from Milton's Use of Presidential
Power, 1789-1943. What Milton has to offer must be pieced
together from scattered and meager bits of evidence, and it
doesn't add up to a very illuminating picture how the
President moves toward his objectives by maneuvering the
power of the bureaucracy. None of the other books under
review do any better on that point.
Can Congress Control the Executive-Administrative Branch?
The time-honored and experience-tested way of keeping the
chief executive and the administrative branch in hand is to set
up a representative assembly to control them. Without exception,
every nation that makes any pretense at having popular government depends on an elected assembly to restrain and guide if
not to control the chief executive and the bureaucracy. As noted
above the downfall of absolute monarchies was accomplished by
the establishment of parliaments; and one of the very first
moves of the dictator is to destroy the legislative body.
The explanation of the power of the representative assembly
is as simple as 'it seems at first glance. Barring act of God,
there is nothing to control the action of men except the action
of other men. The representative assembly, in this case Congress,
is chosen by separate constituencies scattered from one end of
the country to the other. The voters in these constituencies can
be just as independent as their interests and their courage incline
them to be, and the representatives they send to Congress can
and do defy the President when conscience or local interest
dictates. It is .a great honor to serve in Congress and men of
ambition go out for it. Most of the constituencies are populous
(entire states in the case of Senators) and generally it takes
tough men to win the seats and hold them.
Congressmen are pretty stout politicians in their own right,
and there are a lot of them accumulated in the two chambers.
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No President has ever succeeded in lining them all up, even in
time of war; and rarely if ever does a President have a firm
hold on the loyalty of all members of his own party. An assembly
like this is, as long as it exists, a fatal obstruction to the
ambitions of a would-be dictator. Concepts of public interest,
loyalty to established institutions and practices, considerations
of local, special or personal advantage-all of these things combine to block the autocrat's path to power.
The effectiveness of the representative assembly depends on
the quality of the men who are elected to it and on the power
they have over the making and enforcement of the nation's
policies. The quality of the men will be determined by the
health and vigor of the entire political system of the country.
If the people are concerned about public affairs, if the people
are reasonably in control of the party organization at the
bottom, if the national organization of parties is firmly based on
the local party organizations-then it may be taken for granted
that as high a quality of men will be sent to the national
assembly as the prestige and authority of that body invites.
The methods by which the legislature holds the chief
executive and the administrative departments in check are
pretty well standardized throughout the world. Save where constitutional provision interferes, the act of the legislature creates
the administrative department, determines much of its internal
organization, and fixes many of its procedures. In enacting the
laws which determine what the government is to do for the
people, the legislature specifies in varying amounts of detail
how the departments shall accomplish these purposes. The legislature appropriates money for the maintenance of administrative
departments and for their use in achieving the objectives prescribed by law. Ordinarily such grants are hedged about by
precautions as to what the money is to be used for and how it
is to be paid out. The legislature constantly shouts its dissatisfaction with administration, questions and criticizes, and may
carry investigation to the point of thorough exploration and
exposure. And finally, it may have the power to remove the
.other countries by forcing resignation on a vote refusing support
-in this country by the little used impeachment method, in many
other countries by forcing resignation on a vote refusing support
to the government of the day.
An assembly composed of independent, courageous and
intelligent men and possessing all of the powers normally enjoyed
by a legislative body may still fail to maintain an adequate
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control over the executive-administrative branch because not
organized to exercise effectively the powers which it has. This
is generally admitted to be the difficulty in the case of Congress
today. Senators and Representatives are as competent and as
public spirited a group as any nation is likely to get together in
such numbers by any device that might be tried. And the powers
of Congress under the Constitution give it ample authority for
any purpose it could reasonably want to accomplish. But Congress
is not adequately organized to accomplish its purposes. The
apparent shortcomings of this character are enumerated in a
recent careful study by a Committee of The American Political
Science Association, the principal ones being: Congress allows
itself to be tied up with matters of local or special concern which
divert its attention from matters of greater national importance;
it does not maintain a staff adequate to do the investigation and
give it the advice which it requires; it destroys any chance of a
systematic and coordinated attack on questions of public policy
by the way in which it splits up its business and parcels it out to
committees; it does not have good working relations with the
President; and it has not provided itself with adequate facilities
for the continuous inspection and review of administrative
action.17
Pusey is the only author in the series being reviewed who
faces up squarely to the importance of the representative assembly to democratic government. His concern that Congress clear
away the debris of practice and attitude that handicaps it in
dealing with modern public problems was noted above. But
Pusey's discussion, no matter how wise, is not detailed enough
to supply a measure of the distance Congress has backed away
from its responsibilities, or to point out the hurdles that have to
be overcome in order to give it the authoritative position that
it ought to have. A much more complete job of this sort is
done in two recent reports on the reorganization of Congress:
The Reorganization of Congress, by a committee of the American
Political Science Association mentioned above, and Strengthening
the Congress, prepared by Robert Heller for The National
Planning Association. 18 About the time these reports appeared,
and perhaps influenced by the fact that they were in preparation,
17. The Reorganization of Congress; A Report of the Committee on Congress of the American Political Science Association, Public Affairs Press
(Washington, 1945).
18. Heller, Strengthening the Congress, National Planning Association
Planning Pamphlet No. 39 (Washington, 1944).
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Congress set upon a thorough self-scrutiny of itself and its relation to the great public undertakings that it is to control. The
vigor with which its self-investigation is going on, the concern
for its more effective operation which so many members of the
two houses have revealed, and the encouragement of a more
vigorous legislative leadership which has come from so many
sources combine to make it appear likely that Congress will
rearm itself to assume whatever it believes to be its proper
role in the democratic process.
As Congress finds ways of freeing itself for a full exercise
of its powers, it ought, of course, to make up its mind how its
powers are to be used. And the people of the nation ought to
be making up their minds on the same subject. The importance
of this is nowhere more clear than when applied to the relation
of Congress to the executive-administrative branch. There is
general agreement on the part of those who speak or write on
the subject that Congress should have fuller knowledge of what
the administrative departments do, and should in some way
hold them to account for their actions. There is much less agreement as to how much of a brake Congress should be on the
President. And there is nothing approaching agreement concerning the means by which Congress should exert its influence over
either the President or the administrative departments.
As to the relation of Congress to the presidency, I think
enough was said for the purposes of this essay in the preceding
section dealing with the Relation of the President to Responsible
Exercise of Administrative Power. 9 As to the relation of Congress to the administrative departments, a lot more ought to be
said than can be put down here. As far as I can learn, there is
no dissent from the proposition that Congress should maintain
a firm hand on the allocation of public money to administrative
departments by the process of enacting appropriation laws; but
there is a great deal of feeling that Congress frequently defeats
its own purpose in the particular limitations which it fixes on the
way the appropriation may be spent. No one will deny that
Congress should determine whether important new departments
are to be created; but' there will be plenty of argument as to
how fully Congress should control the internal structure of the
department, as to whether the President should not have a free
hand to consolidate and reorganize departments, and even as to
whether the President should not bring new agencies into ex19. Supra p. 320.
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istence on his own authority, at least with the expectation that
Congress will later approve their existence with whatever modification it may insist upon. No one who claims any respect for
democratic government will deny that policies enacted by Congress should determine the nature of the regulation and the
service that constitute government of the people; but opinions
will differ sharply as to how much detail should be written
into the statute and how much authority to render broad policies
into working programs should be delegated to the administrative
department. And finally, while every one readily acknowledges
that Congress should have unlimited power to determine whether
its policies are being carried out, students, observers and participants will take innumerable different positions when asked to
indicate how much inquiry, suggestion and sharp reprimand
Congress may properly subject the administrative department
to with respect to its current operations.
A recent book by Mr. Roland Young entitled This Is Congress
appears to supply the best description of the ways by which
Congress lays a controlling hand on the current operations of
the administrative department.20 I understand that Mr. Young is
generally sympathetic toward a substantial- amount of current
congressional supervision of administrative activities. In a recent
carefully reasoned article Mr. Pendleton Herring shows how
such current control can constitute mere meddling and lead to
frustration of virtually everyone concerned, and sets forth clearly
why he thinks such congressional activity should be reduced to
a minimum.21 Herring has amply evidenced in this article and
in other writings that he is firmly committed to a powerful
legislative body as principal guarantor of democratic government.
He does not believe that a man can take orders from two bosses
without getting into trouble; he thinks that the President can
keep the several administrative departments under rein and
that Congress can force reasonable accountability upon the
President for what they do; he concludes that it is better for
Congress to leave to the President the job of directing the administrative branch in its day to day work while Congress devotes
itself to problems of public policy which present themselves in
broader aspects.
Herring presents an attractive argument. There are enough
forces in this world making for confusion in purposes and conflict
20. Young, This is Congress (1943) 182-218, 155-159.
21. Herring, supra note 16.
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in instructions without our definitely inviting more of them. Any
arrangement which provides clear directives to our administrative
departments and removes all excuse for departing from those
directives appears on its face to be a good arrangement. But I can
go along with Herring only if I am sure that the President can
and will keep the administrative departments in hand and that
Congress in turn can keep the President from directing them
toward ends which Congress does not approve. Of these things
I am not sure, and therefore I am at present unable to accept
Herring's proposal that Congress withdraw from current control
of (or interference with) administrative operations.
As I have said earlier in this essay, I think that control of
the bureaucracy by the chief executive is much more control by
a mass of institutions than control by the President. I am by no
means certain that these institutional devices have to respond
either to the will of the President or the will of Congress with
the readiness that I think desirable. Even if the President were
able personally to review and order a change in the conduct
of administrative departments, I should want Congress to maintain a close watch on what he does and what they do under his
direction.
In theory Congress ought to be able to exert sufficient
control over the executive-administrative branch through general
legislation, appropriation of money and investigation of alleged
abuses of power. But Congress will not know what legislation
to enact, how to appropriate intelligently, or when to investigate
unless it maintains pretty close contact with administrative
departments. If Congressmen get close enough to the bureaucracy
to get the information they need for proper legislative action,
they are pretty certain to make suggestions as to how the
department can do a better job of carrying out the intent of
statutes and appropriations. If, as I suspect, the kind of knowledge that will support intelligent legislation can be had only
at the cost of some meddling by Congressmen in the day to day
operations of the administrative department, I am willing to
let the administrator and the bureaucrat bear that cross.
This is not an argument for all of the congressional interposition into administration that goes on today. Too many Congressmen misconceive themselves to be a majority of Congress
and virtually order administrative officials to depart from administrative policies that have been worked out with greatest concern
for the public interest. Committees of Congress too frequently

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. VI

forget that they are not two chambers of the legislative body
and make demands on the administrative department that it must
ignore out of loyalty to' a more authoritative expression of
congressional will. The safer way for America, as I see it at
this time, is to reduce the meddling and regularize the excursions
and forays of Congress into the administrative area; not to bar
Congress from such activity on a theory of presidential supremacy
over administration.
Can the People Control the Bureaucracy by Direct Action?
The emphasis of this essay to this point has been on the
things that bureaucrats can do to thwart the public will, and on
the measures that we may take to circumvent their evil deeds.
Our system of democracy would be a dismal failure if it produced
an administrative personnel which we suspected of having a
conscious intention to destroy the liberties of the people. The
fact is, of course, that ordinarily the bureaucracy is doing just
what we expect it to be doing. Instead of trying to thwart the
public will, it is. seeking earnestly to carry out the mandate of
Congress and trying to please everybody. And it is behaving in
this way because responsible officials want to do the right thing,
not because of the im'minent prospect of reprimand by the
President or exposure by Congress.
The eagerness with which a department seeks to please the
public undoubtedly depends in large part on the intimacy of
its contact with the segment of the public affected by its
action. It's a lot easier to be arrogant to people you never see
than to individuals who may toss it back in your face; and most
of us will be slow to shortchange a man out of his legal rights
if we know he'll be back tomorrow with a bunch of his
neighbors who suspect they may be next in line for such treatment. In order to make sure that the bureaucrat has to look
at and listen to the public that he governs, we move in on him
from. front and rear. We provide by law that he must consult
with the governed in one way or another, and the governed band
together in organizations to run him down if he seeks to evade
them through any loophole in the law.
The nature of special interest or pressure groups and the
ways by which they seek to influence public officials are pretty
well known and, in view of the necessary brevity of this essay,
need not be discussed here. There is space for little more than
identification of the arrangements prescribed by law or volun-
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tarily adopted, by which we seek assurance that the administrative branch will find out what the public wants and take it into
account in executing the law. The more important of these
arrangements are: (a) the appointment of leaders (political,
civic, industrial, etc.) to official positions; (b) hearings on proposed action; (c) attitude and opinion polls, and popular
referenda; and (d) official representation of interest groups.
The Appointment of Leaders to Administrative Positions. This
is probably the oldest and undoubtedly the most dependable device
for making sure that the administrative department will voluntarily seek to use its authority in accord with the public interest.
In a democratic system like ours, the victory of a party in the
national election is followed by the appointment of leaders of
that party to cabinet positions and to other high offices in the
administrative branch. This creates a strong presumption that
the administrative departments will faithfully follow the instructions of the new administration, whose judgment as to
what the people want the government to do is the most accurate
expression of the will of the electorate.
We depend on the appointment of leaders to high offices for
other purposes than that of securing loyalty to the party program. When we wish an expression. of national unity, as during
the late war, leaders of the opposite political party will be lifted
to high office, thus assuring all parts of the population that the
dominant party is not running things for its exclusive benefit.
In order to satisfy labor that the government is not stacked
against it, persons with known sympathy for labor if not definitely identified. as labor leaders, go into many of the top positions
in the Labor Department and its associated boards. For the
same reasons persons with agricultural interests go into the
Department of Agriculture and men of reputation in business,
industry and finance go into top positions in such departments
and agencies as Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, and Reconstruction Finance Corporation.,
A wide distribution throughout the administrative service
of men who have risen to prominence by demonstrating their
right to public confidence is one of the strongest guarantees that
the bureaucracy will be sensitive to the wishes of the people
and that the chief executive, in his innermost councils, will
constantly be reminded of his promises to the people. Whenever
the chief executive fills the most important posts of the government with men of, secondary stature in the eyes of the nation
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it can be concluded that he is bent on an organization dominated
by personal loyalty to him or to the boss or clique that gives
him his orders.
Hearings. A department with any substantial power to disturb the rights of the people or upset their expectations, soon
learns to take the people into its confidence. Public acquiescence
is more likely to be won when the people are prepared for the
administrative decision than when it comes as a surprise.
Realization of this fact leads to queries about public satisfaction
with existing policies, consultation concerning proposed orders,
and sometimes submission of alternative proposals for expressions
of preference.
It has long been the custom to require a formal hearing in
cases where the action of the administrative officer determines an
individual's rights under the law. The practice has been found
so satisfactory that it has been extended by voluntary action of
the administrator and by law to many situations bearing little
resemblance to a judicial case. The Federal Communications
Commission, for instance, during the current year invited the industry and the interested public to express themselves as to
whether all television broadcasting should be pushed up into the
higher frequencies or stay "dOwnstairs" where it has been operating in the experimental stage. Public hearings on proposed rules
and regulations, the exception a few decades ago, is fast becoming
the customary procedure in both state and national government.
The utilization of hearings as'a general practice is sometimes
opposed on the ground that the hearing enables an active segment
of the interested public (large industries, for instance) to get
together with the administrative department on a plan of
action that a much greater part of the public would oppose if it
knew what was up. It is also said that hearings lead to departures from the central policy which the administration has
committed itself to, and that this is a thing to be deplored.
Neither of these objections seems to me to challenge the hearing
as an aid in formulating public policy. Certainly an administrative
official who is crooked or biased will use the hearing, as he will
use other devices, to accomplish his purposes; but the open
hearing will put a stop to more of this sort of thing than it will
encourage. And public policies that will not stand up against
the evidence and argument that a hearing brings to light are
public policies that ought to be revised anyway.
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Attitude and Opinion Polls and Popular Referenda. The
hearing has two very important limitations as a device for advising the administrative official as to what he should do. Only a
small part of the interested public will or can attend the hearing,
and you can't well call a hearing until you have a pretty concrete
proposal to argue about. A device that will carry questions to
people of every shade of interest and get their judgment on issues
before the cards are stacked for one solution or another, ought to
be of great utility in making our government what the people
in their sober moments really want it to be. Polls conducted by
private enterprise, such as the Gallup poll, may supply the
administrative official with considerable useful information, but
cannot be depended on to give him what he wants when he
needs it. The Department of Agriculture has accordingly set up
a unit to find out what the farmers and other people with agricultural interests want in the way of agricultural policy, and how
they react to action taken by the department. This undertaking
has been opposed by some Congressmen on the ground that, it
sets up the administrative department as a rival of Congress in
determining what kind of government the people want. The
point seems ill-taken to me. Congressmen should be the final
authority as to what policies the people want, and they should
have a good polling system at their command to supplement
their ear-to-the-ground findings. But as long as Congress continues to delegate important discretionary powers to the administrative departments, it should rejoice that the department
makes a conscientious and systematic effort to find out what the
people want it to do.
The popular referendum is utilized in a number of states to
permit the people to determine finally whether they want a
proposed law to go into effect. This device has been adapted
in recent years to proposals for administrative action, at least
in the fields of labor relations and agricultural controls. By
requirement of law, many of the acts of authorities charged with
settlement of labor difficulties depend on decisions made by labor
in a carefully supervised election. Under federal agricultural
legislation, the determination as to whether crop quotas shall" go
into effect are determined by the vote of farmers who produce
that crop. This kind of appeal to the wish and the wisdom of the
governed offers a route to better government in many fields
of public affairs. Where the issue is clearcut and the people who
are affected know where their interest lies, the referendum
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should prove to be an important feature of democratic goiernment.
Official Representation of Interest Groups. Something was
said above about the wisdom of appointing to high places in an
administrative department individuals who enjoy the confidence
of the part of the population that will be most affected' by the
department's action. Ordinarily this gives us a pretty good
assurance that the official understands the particular governmental problems that are involved, but to make sure of this we
frequently ptovide by law that a number of those high officials
shall be drawn directly from the ranks of the population which
has most at stake. As an illustration, during the agricultural
hard times of around 1920, farm bloc Congressmen forced into the
Federal Reserve Act a requirement (since repealed) that at least
one member of the Federal Reserve Board be a farmer or a
person with other definite agricultural interests. There are many
requirements like this in federal and state law, but we have
'shoWn an increasing tendency in recent years to go much further
than this by providing that the organizations which best represent particular interest groups shall designate persons to serve
on advisory councils, submit panels from which members of
boards and other officials shall be chosen, and in some instances
even designate the official who shall hold the public office.
After a careful study of experience with various devices for
representation of interest groups, Mr. Avery Leiserson concludes
that it is not sound policy to make up an administrative board
(i. e., a board that has authority to issue orders) of representa22
tives of different interest groups. On the other hand, designation
of such representatives to advisory councils has been a very
satisfactory experiment. The availability of such bodies to offer
counsel and criticism constitutes a major assurance that the
exercise of administrative power will be in the public interest.
We could hardly have administered our wartime controls without
a multitude of such advisory bodies attached to the War Production Board, OPA, the Petroleum Administrator for War and
other control agencies.2"
22. Leiserson, Administrative Regulation: A Study in Representation of
Interests (1942) 110, 113-15, 130-33.
23. Three major experiments in developing public policy through direct
participation of the governed, each now terminated or in suspense, should be
mentioned. In 1919 the Federal Trade Commission began a practice of calling
together representatives of the individuals and firms engaged in particular
kinds of business and industry, for the purpose of drafting codes of fair practice which would govern the competitive practices of the participants. Sev-
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In 1936 Mr. E. Pendleton Herring published a book entitled
Public Administration and the Public Interest which explored
the relations between interest groups and the principal administrative departments of the national government and made many
thoughtful comments about the significance of these relations
for democratic government. It is interesting that only one of
the authors under review found worthy of even casual comment
a subject so important to democratic government and one to
which Herring devoted a very substantial volume. It is particularly surprising that Appleby should have passed this matter by,
since he was for many years in the Department of Agriculture
when it was making extensive use of planning committees,
advisory councils, polls and referenda.2 4
Kingsley is the only author in the group who gives any
attention to the contacts between the bureaucracy and the people they serve. His Representative Bureaucracy traces the history
of the British civil service from the thirteenth century to the
present with the primary purpose of observing the relation
between the people who possess wealth and power generally and
the people who hold the jobs in the government service. As one
would expect, at a time when wealth, political power and other
evidences of special advantage were concentrated in families
(the nobility and the near noble), the important posts in the
government service went to members, friends and supporters
of those families. As a middle class came to power in the economy and politics of the nation, middle class people pushed into
eral hundred such codes were drafted within a ten year period, but the
program was abandoned shortly after the beginning of the Hoover administration. During the early days of the New Deal, the National Industrial Re-

covery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act required persons and firms
engaging in common industrial or business undertakings to draw up and submit for approval codes which should provide for such control of the business
or industry as the current emergency might make necessary. Several hundred such codes went into effect, most of them providing for representatives

of the business or industry to participate in the administration of the code.
A few years prior to our entry into World War II, the United States Department of Agriculture instituted a system of farmer representation which had

as its goal an agricultural planning committee for every county in the United
States having a substantial agricultural production. These committees were
made up of farmers chosen by a democratic process of selection and representatives of the federal and state agricultural agencies operating in the coun-

try. It was intended that these committees should find out what the
wanted after thinking about it, and pass that information on up to
partments and agencies having regulatory authority in agricultural
for consideration in carrying out the law. Congress seems to have

farmer
the deaffairs
feared

that these channels would be used to carry bureaucratic ideas down to the
farmer rather than the opposite, and the funds were cut off shortly after we

entered the war.
24. Appleby gives one paragraph to the subject: Appleby, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 127.
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the public service. But conquest of the administrative branch
comes late in the advance to power. It was not until sometime
after Parliament was reformed by the extension of the suffrage
in 1832 that the middle class'made any important inroads in the
public service. For a couple of decades after that date, Kingsley
says, "There remained, to be sure, a considerable aristocratic
residue and entrance to the Service continued to be a matter of
connection and influence; a fact which effectively closed the
door to the great bulk of families, and created a reservoir of
dissatisfaction which ultimately overflowed and swept the whole
system away.""
Now in our own time the British people have elevated to
power a Labor Party which is presumably much more to the
left than any party we are likely to turn our government over to
for some time in the future. It is perfectly clear that that party
will not be able to' get its sons and daughters into the civil
service until it has had time at least to tear down the system of
qualifications and examinations for entrance into the service;
and probably the working class will not get control of a very
substantial proportion of the more responsible positions until a
whole new system of public supported education is in effect.
Today the positions in the British civil service that are not
of a highly technical or professional character (such as those
requiring training, in medicine or law) are divided into three
principal classes: Clerical, Executive and Administrative.. To
get into the Clerical Class of position, a boy or girl ,must have
completed the elementary schools and be well along in the
secondary schools; yet only about one of every ten children who
enter the elementary schools gets into the secondary schools at
all (compared to one out of two in the United States). The next
higher general class of positions (the Executive Class) requires
completion of the secondary schools; Kingsley does not indicate
what proportion of British children finish the secondary schools
but it must be very small. The highest general grade of the
service is the Administrative Class. To get into this class a young
man (very few women are admitted) must be a graduate of a
university. But only one youth out of one hundred forty-five
who start their education in the elementary schools finally gets
into a university (as compared with one in ten in the United
States). Further evidence supplied by Kingsley shows that most
of the individuals who finally get into this highest class of service
25. Kingsley, op. cit. supra note 1, at 56.
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came up by way of secondary schools and universities that educate ve-ry few who are not sons of the Wealthy.
Summarizing all of this Kingsley says, "Because equality of
educational opportunity does not exist in England, the fact that
the Service classes are linked to various rungs of the educational
ladder means that each is drawn pretty largely from a distinct
stratum of society. . . . To a remarkable degree each Service
class is also a social class-a caste-and the Service heirarchy
pretty accurately mirrors the economic and social heirarchies
2
outside.1 8
In a chapter bearing the subtitle, "The Shape of the Responsible Managerial State," Kingsley argues that the wish and the
ability of the bureaucracy to fulfill the will of the people depends
on the extent to which the bureaucracy is in sympathy with the
purposes which underlie the policies of the nation. When the
upper middle classes of Great Britain dominated Parliament and
passed the nation's laws, a civil service drawn from the same
classes could and did loyally serve its masters and faithfully
execute the laws of the land. But when the purposes of the
nation change, as presumably they will under a Labor Party
Government, a bureaucracy dominated by the upper middle
class, Kingsley believes, cannot possibly have a point of view
and a body of convictions that will enable it to carry out the
new policies effectively and in good faith., Either the Labor
Party must find a way of reconstituting the civil service, or it
will find its program sabotaged and scuttled at the level of
administrative execution.
This is an interesting thesis and one which I have no, doubt
can be fully supported by the history of administration in Great
Britain. Undoubtedly Kingsley's conviction of this point grows
out of his study of British experience. It should be noted, however, that the facts about the composition and organization of
the British Civil Service which make up the bulk of Kingsley's
book, while they reveal clearly the class composition of the civil
service, do not really provide any substantial evidence that a
class dominated civil service shows any favoritism for its own
class or is unable to execute faithfully laws that are designed for
the benefit of another class. A study designed to explore that
matter thoroughly would be of greatest utility in advancing our
study of democratic government; and I know of no person more
26. Id. at 148.
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capable than Kingsley of doing the job as it ought to be done.
Can the Government Get Too Big to Be Controlled?
Democracy was described at the beginning of this essay as
a system of government in which the people control the individuals who have political power. If a government can get so big
or so powerful that the people are no longer able to control the
individuals who make up that government, then that government has ceased to be a democracy.
An effort has been made throughout this essay to point out
the things the bureaucracy can do that limit the ability of the
citizen to make free judgments on political questions; the power
of the administrative department to release or withhold information about its own activities is an illustration. If the President
throws his power and prestige on the side of the bureaucracy in
an effort to hoodwink or coerce the citizen, then the chance for
the individual to form critical judgments is further reduced. The
legislative assembly, chosen by separate constituencies throughout the nation, is the citizen's ultimate hope, both for information as to what is going on in the government and for defense
against the oppression of those who are in power. If the members of the legislative body also get incorporated into a gigantic
political organism and become an arm of an octopus that is
reaching out in many directions to strangle the citizen, then the
nation indeed loses its assurance that the people will control
the government.
Some persons will assert their independence and express
their opinions on political questions until they are closed up by
physical force. Most of us can be closed up, or at least toned
down, by an immediate danger of losing our economic income.
Under capitalism we have to date felt sure that the government
does not to any important degree control our economic livelihood. We have accordingly not been afraid to criticize our
political leaders and our public officials; and we have had a
vigorous democracy. The businessman, the farmer, labor, Wall
Street have all opposed this administration or that; economic
power under capitalism stands forth to oppose political power.
As the government grows in its authority and does more and
more for the individual, the sense of freedom to oppose those
who are in control of the government dwindles away. Workers
who are on relief tend to become supporters of the administration
that is supporting them. When farmers expect loans from the
government they think twice before they offend the official who
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will pass on the loans. When businessmen want their businesses
underwritten by the government, they tend to become nonpolitical. These are the things that happen as a nation moves
into socialism.
Can a nation find a way of preserving political freedom for
the individual under a socialist program? If political power comes
to include virtually all economic power, can separate pockets of
power be maintained which can in comparative safety and with
hope of success oppose the individuals who sit on top of the great
pile of political-economic power? These are questions that America must answer if it persists in moving towards socialism and
wants to do so without abandoning its democracy.
We have some devices which offer some hope. Under our
federal system, the forty-eight states have considerable authority; men who control the state governments have an amount of
power in their hands which will enable the courageous ones to
stand out against Washington. If we are willing to establish
governments worthy of exercising the range of authority that the
states once possessed, we might even turn more power back to
the states. If we are willing to build more responsible local
government, we can lodge more authority in these units, with
a resultant increase in the safety for men who will stand on
their convictions in political affairs. We can even plan the
fragmentation of power within the national government. Much
of the regulatory authority of the national government is today
parcelled out to commissions that maintain a substantial independence of the President and the political party currently in
control of the government. This system of independent trusteeships can be continued and extended.
Any proposal to fragmentize the control of the current program of the government runs contrary to the dominant theory
of the political scientists of this country. For a decade, at least,
they have insisted that the welfare of the people depends on
the integration of all governmental authority of the national
government under the immediate direction of the president.
Further, if I read them right, they present almost a solid
front for the passage of authority over questions of nationwide
concern from the states and local governments up to the government in Washington. In my personal opinion, such a movement
towards centralization when connected with a march toward
socialism, may well lead to the immediate loss of the people's
control over their political and economic destiny.
If I judge correctly from the tone of their writing, Appleby
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is confident that we can organize the socialist state under democratic management, and Kingsley looks with pleasure on the
prospect that we may have an opportunity to prove that we can
do so. It may be that I wrongly interpret Appleby and Kingsley;
I do not mistake von Mises and Hayek. The latter two believe
that the reconciliation of socialism with democracy is not possible. The men who wrote our federal constitution, says von
Mises in his Bureaucracy, "would have easily understood that
government control of business is ultimately incompatible with
any form of constitutional and democratic government. It is not
an accident," he continues, "that socialist countries are ruled in
a dictatorial way. Totalitarianism and government by the people
are irreconcilable. . . . Under government control of business,
parliaments cannot be anything else than assemblies of yes

men.,

27

This is a charge of most serious moment if it can be supported
by fact or reason, and Appleby and Kingsley and you and I
should thoroughly search our souls and painfully restudy all the
evidences before again supposing that we can find enough freedom of individual action in a socialized economy to support a
democratic political structure. But von Mises does not produce
even the little bit of fact and reason necessary to establish a
presumption in favor of his warning. As best I can determine
what the body of his book is about, he has developed a proposition (a purely academic one to my mind) that people who work
for profit have a basis for deciding what they have accomplished
(i. e., they know whether they are making profits or not) but
people who do not work for profit, like a government offiicial or
the manager of a hospital, do not have any way of knowing
whether they are operating efficiently or achieving what they
want to achieve. In the latter case, according to von Mises, the
undertaking is bureaucratic. "Bureaucratic management is the
method applied in the conduct of administrative affairs the result
of which has no cash value on the market. Remember: we do not
say that a successful handling of public affairs has no value, but
that it has no price on the market, that its value cannot be
realized in a market transaction and consequently cannot be
Bureaucratic management is
expressed in terms of money ....
management of affairs which cannot be checked by economic
2
calculation.11 1
27. von Mises, op. cit. supra note 1, at 8.
28. Id. at 47-48.
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As far as I know there is no copyright on the word "bureaucracy" and Mr. von Mises has a right to define it in this way if he
wants to. But I would not have gone to the trouble to: read his
book if I had known that that was all he had to say; and I may
say that after reading it very carefully and then checking
through some of my marginal notations I do not find anything
more in it than that. The book may even be positively harmful
if it causes people to suppose there is nothing to be said in
support of the proposition that democracy and socialism are
incompatible.
It is unfortunate that before von Mises' book could have circulated widely enough to have done much damage, Mr. Hayek
gave us a book, The Road to Serfdom, that misses few of the
angles in telling us that we cannot have socialism and have
democracy at the same time. Hayek's book is as comprehensive
as that of von Mises is fragmentary; it is as profound as that of
von Mises is trivial.
The Road to Serfdom is founded on a firm faith in capitalism,
and an utter horror of the cruelty done in the name of socialism
in Nazi Germany. Like von Mises, the people we call orthodox
ecenomists, and most businessmen, Hayek believes that the decisions people make when they buy and sell goods supply the best
evidence of what they really value and want the economic system
to produce. Hayek does not believe that we could have a system
of buying and selling under socialism that would register free
decisions of the people as to what they want, and therefore
serve as a reliable guide as to what should be produced. And
he does not believe that we can find a substitute for the market,
such as surveys and polls, that would give us the same information about what the people really want.
Because Hayek is so moved by his observation of events in
Nazi Europe, his book has been called hysterical. If it is hysterical, it is so only in the sense that the author may have been
unduly scared by what happened in Europe. There is nothing
hysterical in the arrangement of words into sentences and paragraphs. Indeed, I should say that the author has selected and put
together words with extreme care to convey the exact idea that
he wants to establish. I do not see how he could be charged with
inviting the reader to misunderstand, underestimate or exaggerate what he says; in this sense, the book seems to me to be a
masterpiece.
Hayek is not against all forms of government control of busi-
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ness, as von Mises so loudly declares himself to be. Government,
according to Hayek, should and must police the economic system
sufficiently to make sure that the market is free, to make sure
that there is genuine and not merely an appearance of competition' in the production and exchange of goods and services. And
he enumerates other measures which the people should take
through government to guarantee that individual men will have
freedom to learn, to think and to act as men must in a democratic
system. In a competitive economy, properly policed by a democratic government, no one acquires enough power over the population at large to keep men from expressing free judgments.
As long as men believe in capitalist economy and democratic
government and insist on a proper balance between the two,
Hayek argues, their economy will supply their material and cultural wants and government will keep that economic system
healthy. If, however, government gets out of its proper role it
must resort to the judgment of legislators and bureaucrats for the
decisions that the people should make in the market place. These
officials have no way of knowing what the people really want, so
they make decisions concerning what shall be produced and how
it shall be distributed which of necessity deny to some people the
things they most value. The dissenters will start to kick and demand exceptions to the plan; the planners of the economy will
insist that their decisions must stand or the whole idea of the
plan must be thrown out; the people must then choose between
standing by socialism or going back to capitalism; if they stand
by socialism and make the plan stick, then coercion has to be applied to the dissenters; as coercion is applied to more and more
men, the freedom which they once had is gone, and they lose
their ability to register their political judgments.
This recapitulation of Hayek's argument is too greatly simplified to do him justice, especially in view of the great care with
which he developed his case. While I admire his presentation
exceedingly, it does not convince me. I am not certain that surveys and polls cannot be devised which will give us reliable information as to what the people want the economy to produce.
And I am not certain that it is impossible to set up political controls which will assure the people information sufficient to support independent judgments and enable them both to express
their disagreement with the planners and to turn out of power
the individuals they have put in high places.
While I do not think that Hayek has so established his case
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that skeptics have to agree with him, I nevertheless think that he
has thrown the burden of proof over upon those who would argue
for socialism. I am certain that there is nothing in the literature
produced by political scientists and I doubt that there is anything
in the writing of the economists that makes a better case for
the reconciliation of socialism with democracy than Hayek here
makes for their incompatibility.
The purpose of this essay, declared in the opening paragraphs, is to assist the reader to decide where the more serious
attacks on our democratic system of government are likely to be
made, so that he can be prepared for his part in the defense. I
have not identified every kind of attack that we must anticipate.
I hope I have pointed out enough danger points to remove some
of the excuse for firing aimlessly in the air as so many of us have
been doing for so long.

